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Abstract
The explosion of online social networking (OSN) in recent years has caused damages to organisations due to leakage of
information by their employees. Employees’ social networking behaviour, whether accidental or intentional, provides
an opportunity for advanced persistent threats (APT) attackers to realise their social engineering techniques and
undetectable zero-day exploits. APT attackers use a spear-phishing method that targeted on key employees of victim
organisations through social media in order to conduct reconnaissance and theft of confidential proprietary
information. This conceptual paper posits OSN as the most challenging channel of information leakage and provides an
explanation about the underlying factors of employees leaking information via this channel through a theoretical lens
from information systems. It also describes how OSN becomes an attack vector of APT owing to employees’ social
networking behaviour, and finally, recommends security education, training and awareness (SETA) for organisations to
combat these threats.
Keywords
Information leakage, unauthorised information disclosure, online social networking, social media, advanced persistent
threats, cyber espionage

INTRODUCTION
There have been some high profile cases of employees leaking confidential and sensitive information through online
social networking (OSN) reported in the media. For example, an Israeli military exposed the location and time of an
upcoming raid in his Facebook status update causing Israeli military to cancel the entire operation (BBC, 2010). The
same thing happened not once or twice but 16 times in the U.K. done by Ministry of Defence employees exposing British
Military secrets to the public via Facebook and Twitter (Mansfield, 2010). In the U.S, a congressman who is also the U.S.
House Intelligence Committee member, exposed his secret trip to Iraq when he ‘tweeted’ his arrival in Baghdad using his
mobile and continued posting his whereabouts and the party’s itinerary every few hours (Ng, 2009). The leaked
information will certainly benefit the adversaries, but at the same time will detriment the organisations.
Irresponsible use of social media causes detrimental impacts on organisations in terms of putting organisations' networks
and systems at risk of malware, leading to potential lawsuits due to copyright and defamation, loss of productivity, and
significantly impacting on organisations’ reputation and future revenue (Colwill, 2010; Gudaitis, 2010; Young, 2010).
Recently, OSN has become the target of cybercriminals not only to steal information, but also to use their storage and
bandwidth for botnet command-and-control capabilities (Everett, 2010; Smith & Toppel, 2009; Westervelt, 2009). To
make it worse, Facebook profiles are now available to be downloaded from torrent sites exposing more than 170 million
users’ information globally (Paul, 2010).
Furthermore, cybercriminals nowadays are more interested in gathering information, the value of the organisation, than
to notoriously taking down networks (McAfee, 2010). Some of them are sponsored by certain parties to do extremely
complex attacks to steal sensitive information from the targeted organisations through their employees. They use
information available in the public domain, especially online social media to gather as many information on the key
individuals before launching spear-phishing and social engineering techniques to obtain credentials for accessing the
valuable information (Smith & Toppel, 2009; Sophos, 2010; Symantec, 2010). This threat is called advanced persistent
threat (APT) or cyber espionage, although it is not new, it is rapidly growing due to the proliferation of OSN.
Therefore, organisations both large and small, government agencies or private enterprises, need to pay close attention to
the use of OSN among their employees. They cannot rely solely on technical controls to combat this problem since it
involves human vulnerabilities that need to be safeguarded by behaviour-changing controls such as the implementation
of well-enforced information security policies and, security education, training and awareness (SETA).
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This conceptual paper explores the phenomenon of information leakage among employees through the use of social
networking sites that recently becoming the target of cybercriminals to launch APT attacks. It attempts to answer these
questions, pointing at the direction for further research:
1.
2.
3.

Why employees disclose organisational information on their OSN sites?
How APT attacks on targeted organisations are realised through the use of OSN sites?
How do organisations safeguard their information from being leaked by employees through OSN?

With the answers to these questions, we hope to shed some light on individuals and organisations about OSN as one of
the vectors to APT attacks and suggest SETA as an approach to address this issue.

INFORMATION LEAKAGE THROUGH OSN
This section provides a brief explanation on information leakage and exerts OSN as the most challenging channel of
information leakage. It also attempts to answer the first question: Why employees disclose organisational information on
their OSN sites? We explain employees’ social networking activities which inadvertently and intentionally cause leakage
of information and the reasons why this happens based on a theoretical model from Information Systems (IS). This is
important to understand the causes of information leakage through this channel since based on this understanding, we
suggest a guideline for organisations to mitigate this problem, which will be discussed in the Prevention of Information
Leakage through OSN section.
We define information leakage as “a breach of the confidentiality of information, typically originating from staff inside
an organisation and usually resulting in internal information being disclosed into the public domain” (ISF 2007, p.2).
Although information leakage or unauthorised information disclosure can be caused by malicious and non-malicious
insiders, non-malicious insiders are the greater problem (CSI, 2009) since accidental security incidents happen more
often and have greater potential for harm than malicious insider attacks (Colwill, 2010).
Academic literature indicates that information can be leaked through OSN (Colwill, 2010; Gross & Acquisti, 2005;
Gudaitis, 2010; Leitch & Warren, 2009), face-to-face conversation and printing facilities (Ahmad, Ruighaver, & Teo,
2005), email (Carvalho, Balasubramanyan, & Cohen, 2009), cloud computing (Ristenpart, Tromer, Shacham, & Savage,
2009), domain name systems (Rose, Chandramouli, & Nakassis, 2009) and portable data devices (Colwill, 2010). Among
these channels, we view OSN as the most challenging channel of information leakage. This is because information
disclosed through OSN creates an opportunity for cybercriminals to do surveillance and gather intelligence, sabotage
organisations’ networks using malware and utilize resources to launch attacks through the applications on these sites
(Colwill, 2010; Gudaitis, 2010; Leitch & Warren, 2009).
While information can be leaked through offline social networking such as meetings, conferences and publications
(Jansen, 2010), the leakage through OSN is fundamentally different than its offline counterpart. This is because the
moment employees post sensitive information on their sites, the published information is almost permanent, it can be
reached by many people and, possibly be copied and distributed to someone else. If they leak information face-to-face to
someone, possibly due to the slip of a tongue, the information is confined to the people who heard the conversation, and
even if it is communicated to other people, it becomes hearsay.
Typical OSN sites have the functionalities such as status updates, friends’ requests, photos and videos uploads, third
party applications and links to other websites making them potential avenues of information leakage. Table 1 below
shows OSN’s capabilities as attack vectors through its available functionalities.
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OSN
Functionalities

Potential Security Problems

Post information /
update status

Accessibility of OSN by anyone, anywhere
at anytime, using any devices, allows users
to update their status several times a day,
thus, sensitive information may be revealed.
Carelessness in accepting friends’ requests
could result to adding ‘enemies’ instead of
‘friends’ who have more access to users’
information.

Friends’ Requests

Upload photos
and videos

Third party
applications and
links to external
sites

Impacts to Organisations

Revealed information can be deduced by
attackers to obtain confidential information
about the organisations in order to do
cyber espionage and sabotage.
These ‘friends’ are able to constantly
monitor the employees’ activities within
the organisations allowing them to obtain
employees’ credentials for accessing the
corporate network.
Unrestricted photo albums and videos allow
Sensitive photos and videos may cause
everyone to view the photos and videos that
embarrassment to the organisations and
are potentially sensitive to organisations.
they may be useful for cybercriminals to
collect information.
While using the applications or clicking on
Compromised client platforms allow
the links, malware may infect employees’
attackers to sabotage corporate networks
computing platforms.
and provide access to monitor and steal
intellectual property.
Table 1: OSN functions and potential problems to organisations

In addition to the above, another characteristic of social media that is similar to other Web 2.0 applications is information
in the users’ profiles can be leaked by someone else. Users’ friends or their friends’ friends can post information about
them, or copy the posted information, alter the information and possibly distribute it to someone. Similarly, OSN
providers can share users’ information to advertisers which is common to web advertising practice; the advertisers
receive information that is viewed before the user clicked on their advertisement (Jacobsson, 2010). Hence on these sites,
“the information on the last page viewed often reveals user names or profile ID numbers that could potentially be used to
look up the individuals” (Jacobsson, 2010, p.1). Plus, since many users engage on social networking as their daily
internet activities, these sites becomes the primary attention to attackers to launch targeted attacks on organisations and
individuals by using spams, phishing and malware through OSN applications (Sophos, 2010). The ability of others to
have some control on users’ information and the above functionalities make OSN the most challenging channel of
information leakage due to the difficulty of managing organisational information that is disclosed through employees’
sites.
Although academic literature seldom discusses the information security impacts of OSN on organisations, social
networking sites, especially Facebook and Twitter, have made the headlines since 2009 (Goodchild, 2010). Not only that,
the concern on this channel as an avenue for security threats is supported by renowned security surveys. For example, the
Computer Security Institute (CSI) added ‘exploit of user’s social network profile’ as the new attack type to its 2009
survey (CSI, 2009). Verizon in cooperation with the United States Secret Service (USSS) mentioned in their report that
OSN is one of the attack vectors of security breaches (Verizon & USSS, 2010). Plus, Symantec Global Internet Security
Threat Report 2009 stated that APT attack begins with reconnaissance through these sites to research on the organisation
and its employees (Symantec, 2010). Strengthening this notion, Sophos Security Threat Report 2010 reported that OSN
has “become one of the most significant vectors for data loss and identity theft” (Sophos, 2010, p.1).
“The danger of putting too much personal information online, particularly on social networking sites, was brought
to light when the wife of the chief of the British secret service MI6 posted highly revealing details about their
residence and friends on her Facebook page” (Sophos, 2010, p.6)
Prior to the above incident which happened in July 2009, organisations were concerned about their employees engaging
in OSN because it wasted organisation time and drained the bandwidth, but now, although productivity is still the
concern, organisations are more worried about their confidential information being leaked through employees’ social
networking activities (Gaudin, 2009; Sophos, 2010). As the examples given in the introductory section, even the securitytrained people are capable of exposing confidential information that could jeopardise organisational information security.
Why do these so-called ‘security blunders’ happen? In the next section, we explain this phenomenon by using a
theoretical model from IS.
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THE FACTORS OF LEAKAGE THROUGH OSN
Based on Taylor-Todd’s Decomposed Theory of Planned Behaviour (DTPB), an extension to Theory of Planned
Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), IS use is determined by the intention to perform the behaviour. The behaviour intention is
driven by these three factors: attitude, subjective norms or social influence and perceived behavioural control.

Attitude towards OSN use
The attitude construct of the model portrays that positive attitude towards IS (in this case, OSN as the social IS) use is
based on perceived advantages (usefulness), simplicity (ease of use) and compatibility of the use to their values,
experience and needs (Taylor & Todd, 1995). Similarly, individuals and organisations use OSN because it is perceived as
a useful tool to them. As it is useful for individuals to maintain close relationship and share information with their
friends, it is also useful for organisations to introduce new products and increase reach to customers. Simplicity in using
OSN is key to its popularity (Everett, 2010) since anyone, regardless of age and gender, are using OSN adding to 500
million users of Facebook in July 2010 (Facebook, 2010). OSN becomes the platform for employees to solve workrelated problems by seeking advice from their friends, which is an example to describe users engage in OSN because it is
compatible to their needs. Despite its usefulness, it has a major downside to security. It is also easy for cybercriminals to
launch targeted attacks on victim organisations. They can effortlessly find key employees of the organisation, use social
engineering methods to befriend them, collect information about their organisations and employees’ credentials, and
invite the employees to use an application that actually installs Trojans or backdoors to gain greater access into the
organisation’s networks.

Social Influence
The second construct is social influence from peers and superiors which play a great role on users’ participation in OSN.
OSN is considered as the in-thing today that not participating in it may be considered outdated. Being influenced by
peers engaging in OSN not only blurs the work ethics but also contributes to financial losses. Furthermore, if there is no
guideline on the use of OSN in organisations (superior’s influence), employees may not realise that they are contributing
to the loss of productivity, strains on corporate bandwidth, damage to organisations’ reputation, and more serious
damages; cybercriminal’s sabotage and espionage on the organisations.

Perceived Behavioural Control
While other theories from criminology, psychology and sociology disciplines mostly explain about behaviour that is
intentional, DTPB exerts that behaviour can be accidental and intentional since it is performed within and beyond the
person’s control.
Similar to other insider threats, information leakage through OSN is perceived to be more accidental than intentional
especially due to the pervasive use of mobile devices to access social networking sites. Based on the third construct,
perceived behavioural control, the intention to perform the IS use behaviour is determined by self-efficacy (perceived
ability) and facilitating conditions in terms of resources and technology. As an example to explain accidental information
leakage through employees’ social networking, consider this scenario; due to productivity concerns, an organisation bans
the use of social media during working hours by implementing preventive security systems on their internal networks.
Although this mechanism may work to address employees’ productivity, they are still able to access their sites using
other devices such as ubiquitous smartphones. The ‘always on’ environment allows employees to constantly update their
status, upload photos and videos, and play games, thus inadvertently releasing private work-related information to the
public domain.
On the other hand, employees may leak organisational information through social media intentionally with and without
malicious intent. For example of an act of malicious intent, a disgruntled employee may disclose proprietary information
about their employers or disclose libellous information about the organisation on an OSN site. This is shown by a report
by Verizon that a terminated system administrator stole a co-worker’s password for his site and modified it with
slanderous content (Verizon & USSS, 2010). As an example to intentional information leakage without malicious intent,
an employee may deliberately expose the news about the merging of prominent companies before it is formally made
public by his employer out of enthusiasm and excitement, or simply to show off.
In this section, we have seen why employees use social media based on the determinants of IS use behaviour from DTPB
model. Based on this model, information leakage through OSN is driven by: a) the users’ attitude due to its simplicity
and perceived usefulness, b) social influence from peers and superior, and c) perceived behavioural control which
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explains that while using the IS, the behaviour can be accidental and intentional, due to self-efficacy, available resources
and technologies that facilitate the behaviour. The understanding of these underlying factors assists us to propose an
approach to deal with this problem. But before that, let’s look at how information leakage through OSN provides
opportunity for APT attackers to realise their attacks on targeted organisations, making it the most challenging channel of
information leakage.

ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREATS (APT)
Aurora attacks, cyber industrial espionage and net reconnaissance are among the interchangeable terms used to describe
APT. Although APT is the new term, industrial espionage has existed many years ago and the motives behind it has not
changed since, but the technologies to launch the attack certainly have changed (Grabosky, Smith, & Dempsey, 2001).
With the rise of OSN users worldwide, it has become the target of APT attackers to initiate their attacks (Gudaitis, 2010;
Smith & Toppel, 2009; Sophos, 2010; Symantec, 2010).
APT definitions can vary widely, however, we describe it as a well-funded and well-organised espionage that are
financially motivated, employs social engineering techniques and stealthier zero-day exploits to breach networks that are
rarely detected by preventive security systems with aims to establish long-term occupying force inside an organisation’s
perimeter. Typically, APT attackers target financial, government and defence sectors, however, recently large
organisations are becoming the target. In January 2010, the media reported that Google, Adobe and other large U.S.
organisations were compromised by sophisticated Chinese targeted cyber attacks that appear to be APT attacks. In the
attack, intellectual property, email accounts, and other information were obtained and siphoned to other IP addresses in
Taiwan (Zetter, 2010).

APT Attack Methods
Usually, this type of attack commences with reconnaissance and information gathering on targeted organisations through
identified employees (Smith & Toppel, 2009; Symantec, 2010). The attackers target employees who have access to
valuable information and those who are vulnerable; disgruntled employees, employees with financial problem or with
weaknesses such as gambling, pornography and drug dependence, who can be induced or coerced to cooperate. With the
use of social media, it is not difficult to find out about these characteristics since users are putting up too much
information about themselves; personal as well as work-related information (Goodchild, 2010; Sophos, 2010).
Furthermore, when collecting information from targeted employees’ OSN sites, the information disclosed does not need
to be explicit private organisational information, since APT attackers are able to make deductions from non-private
information and aggregate them to become very useful and valuable information. They will then use the deduced
information to launch attacks on targeted organisations.
Private information on targeted employees can also be gathered through their users’ profiles especially when privacy
settings are not restricted. Research shows that many users do not impose privacy settings on their profiles, allowing
everybody to view their full profiles (Christofides, Muise, & Desmarais, 2009; Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Stutzman, 2006).
A study by Ponemon Institute revealed alarming results in which 60% of the surveyed individuals do not screen friends’
requests before accepting them, 40% take no steps to protect their privacy and security on social media, and 40% share
their passwords with others (Spinney, 2010). These vulnerabilities of OSN users cause APT attackers to easily gather
sensitive information about the employees as well as the organisations to realise their attacks.
Once APT attackers have identified the employees, they will use social engineering techniques to obtain valid user
credentials (Smith & Toppel, 2009). They will use spear-phishing emails that appear legitimate to trick employees into
divulging sensitive information or click on a link or attachment that contains malicious codes. Social media simplifies
this by providing the avenues for APT attackers to install and transport malware to the users computing platforms upon
clicking on links sent by their seemingly legitimate ‘friends’ or using applications on these sites. When the malware is
installed, it allows the attackers to gain control of the system and access to the network with valid employee credentials
that make them undetected (Smith & Toppel, 2009). Hence, employees need to be aware of OSN threats as Gudaitis
(2010, p.6) points out, “even a seemingly innocent tweet can lead an unsuspecting user right into a landing page with
destructive malware”.
In this section, we provide the answer to how APT attacks on targeted organisations are realised through the information
being leaked by employees on their social networking sites. Although we are aware that OSN poses other threats to
organisational information security, employees’ social networking behaviour that can be compromised by APT attackers
make this channel a significant vector of this financially motivated attack that can cause serious damage to organisations.
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PREVENTION OF INFORMATION LEAKAGE THROUGH OSN
Since information leakage through employees’ social networking activities provides the avenue for APT attacks, it is
essential for organisations to address employees' behaviour that leads to this problem. This section provides the
safeguarding measures for organisations to address this problem and answers the following question: How do
organisations safeguard their information from being leaked by employees through OSN?
IS security literature proposed information security policy (ISP), security education, training and awareness (SETA) and
preventive security systems as key deterrents to insider threats (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Straub, 1990;
Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 2005; Workman & Gathegi, 2007). Table 2 below shows how these
control mechanisms can help organisations to deter employees from leaking information through OSN based on their
advantages and disadvantages.
Control
Mechanisms
Information
Security
Policy (ISP)

Security
Education,
Training and
Awareness

Advantages
Well-documented ISP is able to:
x clearly define the classification of
organisational information for employees
to understand the types of confidential
and non-confidential information, and
how to handle them
x specify the rules of the acceptable use of
OSN and corporate assets to ensure
confidentiality, integrity and availability
of information
x provide understandable security policies
that are integrated with business
processes and aligned with job
requirements (CISCO, 2008)

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x

Preventive
Security
Systems

Disadvantages

x

Covers three elements: education, training
and awareness to provide employees with
knowledge,
skills
and
alertness
respectively
Plays a key role in employees’
information
security
compliance
behaviour (Bulgurcu et al., 2010)
Improves employees’ behaviour, and
enable organisations to hold employees
accountable for their actions (Whitman &
Mattord, 2008)
Increases employees’ perceptions of
vulnerability and severity of information
security threats although they do not
experience any security incidents
(Workman & Gathegi, 2007)
Ensures employees understand their
information security responsibilities,
organisational policies and proper use of
IT resources entrusted to them (NIST,
2003)
Minimizes accidental security breaches
(CSI, 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009; Smith
& Toppel, 2009; Whitman & Mattord,
2008)
Allows organisations to encrypt their
confidential information, implement
access controls to classified information
and, monitor and block employee

x

x

x
x

x

The policy needs to be properly
designed, documented, implemented,
enforced and reviewed to ensure its
effectiveness (ISO/IEC, 2005) thus,
requires more resources to mature
Employees’ compliance to ISP is
determined by the understanding,
attitude and beliefs about the severity of
security breaches (Bulgurcu et al., 2010;
Herath & Rao, 2009; Workman &
Gathegi, 2007)
It requires an awareness program to
ensure it is communicated to, understood
and adhered by employees (Bulgurcu et
al., 2010)
SETA is a continuous task and
organisations must think of innovative
ways to keep employees aware and alert
of their responsibility to protect
organisational information (von Solms &
von Solms, 2009)
It requires support from the management
and participation from everyone in the
organisation
May require more resources to promote
awareness through security talks, and
security
reminders
printed
on
newsletters, security posters, mouse pads
and mugs, or published on corporate
websites

If the preventive systems restrict the use
of OSN using corporate networks,
employees can still use personal devices
to access OSN sites
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x

postings on OSN (McAfee, 2010;
Proofpoint, 2009)
Able to restrict the use of chat functions
and third party applications and can be
configured to designate some parts of the
site off-limits (Messmer, 2009).

x

May be able to restrict access to
corporate networks but unable to change
human behaviour (Smith & Toppel,
2009; von Solms & von Solms, 2009)
x Computer-savvy employees are less
deterred by preventive security systems
since they can ‘cheat’ their way through
the system (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009)
x The preventive security systems can be
very costly (Messmer, 2009)
Table 2: Advantages and disadvantages of key deterrents to insider threats

However, which one of these control mechanisms is the most suitable approach to mitigate information leakage through
OSN by employees? As mentioned previously, an organisation may have a security policy to limit the use of social media
during working hours, and to implement this, it utilises a preventive security systems to automatically block access to
these sites. However, the proliferation of OSN access using smartphones and other personal devices, allows sensitive
information to be leaked, making security policy and preventive systems ineffective to prevent information leakage
through this channel.
Furthermore, whilst APT attacks may be stopped by technological defence, the threats coming from direct actions of
people, particularly the actions of compromised or vulnerable insiders are less suitable for software defences. As Smith
& Toppel (2009, p.65) points out, since “APT attackers use valid user credentials and are able to log on to a network as
any trusted employee would, relying on network perimeter defences is no longer effective”. Therefore, organisations
should focus on the human factor, on security awareness (Smith & Toppel, 2009). This again shows that preventive
security systems are ineffective to address this issue.
Hence, we propose the implementation of information security education, training and awareness (SETA), as the
guideline for organisations to address this issue since, as stated in Table 2, SETA plays a key role in employees’
compliance behaviour (Bulgurcu et al., 2010) compared to ISP and technical controls.
According to Whitman and Mattord (2008), the rationale behind SETA is to improve organisational information security
by:
x
x
x

building in-depth knowledge to design, implement, or operate security programs for organisations and systems
through security education for employees with information security responsibilities,
developing employees’ skills to perform their jobs while using IS more securely through security training, and
improving employees’ awareness to protect IS resources through security awareness programs.

Previously, we stated that DTPB theoretical model provides the underlying factors which drive employees’ behaviour are
the determinants of the behavioural intention. These factors are; the attitude of employees towards OSN use, social
influence from peers and superiors, and perceived behavioural control that is determined by self-efficacy and facilitating
conditions. Below we show how SETA can tackle this issue by addressing these factors.

Using SETA to address OSN behaviour
As stated earlier, the attitude towards social networking behaviour is based on the perceived ease of use and usefulness,
and compatibility. As McKenna (2009, p. 19) pointed out “The problem is that it is so easy. Social networking sites ask
you ‘what are you doing now?’ and you respond”. Therefore, organisations should implement SETA programs to alert
employees about the ease of social media use may result to the difficulty of controlling sensitive information appearing
on these sites. Organisations should make their employees aware that once information is posted, it is almost impossible
to control the flow of information because it is as easy for anyone to copy and distribute the information to other people,
including APT attackers. We suggest that organisations should design a comprehensive SETA program that includes
guidelines on the safe and secure use of social media in terms of accepting friends’ requests, updating status, uploading
photos and videos, clicking on links and using applications. The implications of these activities on APT attacks should
also be explained.
With regard to subjective norms or social influence, organisations need to make it mandatory for all employees
regardless of levels and positions to attend the awareness training sessions on the acceptable use of OSN sites and its
impacts on organisational information security. An organisation wide SETA is vital to ensure employees understand their
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information security responsibilities, organisational policies and proper use of IT resources entrusted to them (NIST,
2003). Additionally, all employees should also be informed about APT techniques and how APT can happen through the
reconnaissance of targeted employees and organisations via this channel.
Similar to other insider threats, this problem is perceived to be more accidental than intentional especially due to
pervasive use of mobile devices to access OSN sites. Concurring with Whitman & Mattord (2008), we propose SETA as
the effective control mechanism to minimise accidental security breaches. Therefore, organisations should provide
security education for staff with security responsibilities to design security awareness programs that inform all employees
about the careless use of social media that could lead to damages to the organisation. The awareness will result to more
mindful OSN behaviour while posting status updates, accepting friends’ request, using applications and clicking on links.
It is also imperative for the organisation to clearly state the repercussions of this problem to the organisation as well as to
the employees. Make it clear to them that, targeted attacks on the organisation can cause great financial damages which
can cause employees to lose their jobs. This understanding of the consequences for their actions should be able to prevent
accidental leakage of information through this channel.
Based on these underlying factors of employees leaking information via OSN that subsequently maximises the chance
of APT attacks, we concur that
“Employees must understand the methods used by the attackers to gather information about a company and
themselves. Understanding the tactics used allows them to recognise those situations where they are at risk so
that they can change their behaviour and also know when and how to report suspected incidents.” (Smith &
Toppel, 2009, p.65).
With this notion, we recommend that organisations should provide employees with information security responsibilities
in-depth knowledge on OSN, APT and their impacts to organisations in order to design, implement and operate a
comprehensive SETA program. Organisations should also develop skills for employees to securely engage in social
networking by understanding how APT attacks can occur through social media use and instil awareness among their
employees to protect personal and organisational information through awareness programs on OSN and APT.
Furthermore, organisations need to review and monitor the SETA program to suit the changing computing environment
periodically to ensure current information on information security threats are being communicated to employees.
The approach to understand human behaviour in order to address the behaviour that leads to security problems is an area
worth researching since it defies traditional convention of information security solutions through technical approach. We
acknowledge that information security policy and preventive security systems are also able to address this problem, thus,
we suggest that more research in this area is required focusing on behavioural facets of information security, prior to
confirming that SETA is the better solution to this problem.

CONCLUSION
Disclosed information on social media will not only tarnish organisation’s reputation, but also invite other avenues of
cybercriminals’ attacks on organisations particularly APT that can cause serious financial damage. The ubiquitous nature
of OSN, owing to the available smartphones and other mobile devices, shows that it is becoming a challenging channel
of information leakage that is difficult to be controlled by organisations. The frequent and constant visits to these sites
and social networking activities result to massive disclosure of information about employees and their work-related
information, thus putting themselves and organisations as the target of cybercriminals.
Cybercriminals are currently no longer interested to take down organisations’ networks as notorious acts but they are
more financially motivated to steal valuable information from a targeted organisation. They do this through the weakest
link in the organisation by gathering information of the employees on OSN sites, prior to launching spear phishing and
social engineering attacks to obtain employees’ credentials to ensure undetectable and longer access to the organisation’s
network. APT attackers do this by tricking employees into clicking on a link or using applications on social media to
install Trojans or backdoor connected to a remote command-and-control server that collects organisational intellectual
property. Furthermore, APT attackers are able to do reconnaissance on targeted organisations not only through explicit
leakage of information but also by deducing any work-related information that is inadvertently leaked by employees. The
seemingly insensitive information can be gathered and deduced to make up enough information to gain access
credentials.
This conceptual study explores social media as the most challenging information leakage channel and its link to APT
attacks. It explains how this phenomenon happens through the understanding of the underlying factors of information
leakage via OSN that facilitates the suggestion to combat this problem. Since this threat is due to the actions of
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employees, we suggest more research in this behaviour-changing approach; through the comprehensive design and
implementation of SETA in organisations. This study offers contributions to research and practice by addressing the gaps
concerning the behavioural aspects of information security and OSN security impacts on organisations. It is also
perceived as timely and important considering the current media attention to this phenomenon.
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